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The Difficulty of Moral
Perfectionism
Cavell and Diamond on Self-understanding, Disagreement and Nonsense
in Ethics
Stefano Di Brisco
1 In what follows I want to consider a kind of inexpressiveness that can characterize our
moral experience. The acknowledgement of the possibility of failure in trying to word the
world – in finding adequate means of expression for our condition – deeply informs Cora
Diamond’s  conception  of  language  and  moral  thought  as  well  as  her  philosophical
method. In particular, in her paper The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy
(hereafter DRDP), Diamond is concerned with:
[…]  experiences  in  which  we  take  something  in  reality  to  be  resistant  to  our
thinking it, or possibly to be painful in its inexplicability, difficult in that way, or
perhaps awesome and astonishing in its inexplicability. We take things so. And the
things we take so may simply not, to others, present that kind of difficulty, of being
hard or impossible or agonizing to get one’s mind around. (DRDP: 99)
2 A difficulty of reality in Diamond’s sense is thus a resistance by reality to one’s ordinary
modes  of  thinking  and  talking,  the  feeling  of  a  mismatch  between  concepts  and
experience in which it is the nature of experience itself that deprives one of the words
suitable to contain it.  Importantly,  this kind of difficulty may lead to a philosophical
inadequacy to think these aspects of experience.
3 In this paper I want to show how a particular kind of moral conflict can be perspicuously
described  as  a  difficulty  of  reality.  This  conflict  occurs  when we  lose  the  ability  to
conceive the moral world we inhabit as ours, when, that is, our self-conceptions clash
with the requirements of morality and we find ourselves in the position of not being able
to say what “morality” means for us anymore.
4 Stanley Cavell speaks in this vicinity of the possibility of repudiating morality when it
threatens our integrity (Cavell  1979:  269).  This  distance between the subject  and the
world, the self and morality, which, in Cavell’s account of perfectionism, is a precondition
for the development of an authentic moral perspective, is nonetheless neglected by meta-
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ethical analyses in which the prominent occurrences of ethical disagreements pertain
principally  to  the  correct  application  of  evaluative  terms.  Indeed,  if  we  construct  a
picture of disagreement according to which what morally opposes us is the assessment of
a fact – Is death a just punishment for a prisoner? – or a judgment about a course of
action – Is it courageous to commit suicide in the name of an ideal? –, there is no space
for a question about the sources of the interest we may take in morality on the whole.
5 I begin by sketching Cavell’s analysis of disagreement in the light of his discussion of
moral rationality. Then I will connect the topic with Diamond’s notion of the “difficulty of
reality,”  developing the link between Diamond’s  and Cavell’s  thought by using as an
example a dialogue taken from Richard Yates’ novel Revolutionary Road.
⁂
6 In part III of The Claim of Reason Cavell criticizes the philosophical conception according to
which  the  persistence  of  disagreement  in  some  moral  disputes  compromises  the
possibility of considering moral thought as fully rational. According to Cavell, the need to
anchor  the  rationality  of  moral  discourse  and  thought  in  the  resolution  of  every
disagreement is a philosophical requirement laid down on the ground of an assumption
about the nature of rationality and the role of moral argument. In particular, Cavell holds
that  a  non-cognitivist  analysis  of  disagreement rests  upon the assumption that  what
renders an argument rational is its capacity to generate a shared conclusion from valid
premises,  and so that  the aim of  moral  argument is  to lead the parties  towards the
acceptance  of  such a  conclusion (Cavell  1979:  254).  This  picture  of  moral  rationality
originates in an interest in comparing moral judgments with scientific ones, where the
interest  is  informed by an empiricist  conception of  language as  a  neutral  vehicle  of
contents  –  a  conception  that  borrows  from  science  and  logic  the  epistemological
standards of knowledge and objectivity (Cavell 1979: 173, 253).1 Cavell writes that:
7 If  you  begin  by  being  struck  with  the  peculiarity  of  ethical  arguments  as  perhaps
unsettleable, and struck with how different other questions are, then you will pick up
examples from science which illustrate its capacity for agreement, and you will then have
the idea, or illusion, that you know that, and why, science is rational and morality not
(Cavell 1979: 263).
8 This is intended as a warning that the model of explanation we use determines the form
of the problem under investigation. But it is not only a methodological reminder, for the
empiricist picture of language also implies a stipulative conception of meaning, according
to which the meanings of words are determined by the set of rules settled on the uses of
the community of speakers. But if the meanings of the words we use were always already
available, then there could not be any problem concerning the possibility of expression,
or a difficulty in the way we use our words.  So it  is  already possible to trace a link
between Cavell’s and Diamond’s thought at this stage, since that conception of language
has also been strongly resisted by Diamond. She writes that:
Empiricism makes it  appear as  if  we could not help having whatever words we
needed for our experience: words which were at least adequate to represent it to
ourselves, because whenever words for a kind of experience are lacking there is no
difficulty  in  coining  new  ones.  The  only  problem  there  might  be  would  lie  in
communication with others, and would come from our ignorance for the standard
use of some words. (Diamond 1988: 270)
The Difficulty of Moral Perfectionism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, II-2 | 2010
2
9 In  order  to  resist  this  instrumental  picture  of  language,  Cavell  offers  examples  of
arguments whose conclusion is characterized by rational disagreement: his aim is to show
that what meta-ethics considers a lack of rationality is just a fact of ordinary language.
According to Cavell, a philosophical assessment of moral rationality should begin with
ordinary examples of moral discourse, taken from a real human context. Having these
examples in view, we are in the position of seeing that the philosophical theses that deny
the  rationality  of  morality  (because  it  does  not  present  certain  features  of  what  is
considered as paradigmatic of rationality, namely logic and science) depends itself upon
an assumption about the concept of rationality and morality.
10 Against the idea of rationality as the capacity of arriving at a shared conclusion, Cavell
points to competence as the fundamental feature of a conversation. It is our competence as
speakers indeed that is questioned in a moral conversation, and not the rationality of
ethics  on  the  whole.  This  notion  of  competence  is  tied  to  the  idea  of  meaning  as
depending on our  capacity  to  master  ordinary language.  Cavell  writes  that  in  moral
disagreements:
The point is to determine what position you are taking, that is to say, what position
you are taking responsibility for – and whether it is one I can respect. What is at stake
in such discussions is not, or not exactly whether you know our world, but whether,
or to what extent, we are to live in the same moral universe. What is at stake in
such examples […] is  not the validity of  morality as a whole,  but the nature or
quality of our relationship to one another. (Cavell 1979: 268)
11 Cavell holds that it is crucial,  in moral conversations, to leave open the possibility of
disagreement: the presumed lack of rationality of moral discourse turns out to be our
permanent possibility of questioning the practices and the concepts we share. That is,
this possibility is constitutive of the kind of rationality proper to moral discourse, and has
a central role in the process of coming to know ourselves and others. Cavell goes on to say
that:
discussion is necessary because our responsibilities, the extensions of our cares and
commitments, and the implications of our conduct, are not obvious; because the
self is not obvious to the self. To the extent that that responsibility is the subject of
moral argument, what makes moral argument rational is not the assumption that
there is in every situation one thing which ought to be done and that this may be
known,  nor the assumption that  we can always come to agreement about what
ought to be done on the basis of rational methods. Its rationality lies in following
the methods which lead to a knowledge of our own position, of where we stand; in
short, to a knowledge and definition of ourselves. (Cavell 1979: 312)
12 In moral disagreements we face the problem of knowing ourselves and others. From this
point of view a moral conversation is a way to assess the status of a relationship (with
myself or others): in it we verify if and to what extent we can recognize each other as
members of the same moral community, if we can go on speaking, and so on. But this
problem is  eluded by moral  theories which focus on a conception of  language as an
enclosed space of given activities, a perimeter of fixed rules in which the application of
concepts is not something we do, but a set of predetermined possibilities that we select in
accordance with the contingencies of conversation. Cavell holds that this conception of
language hides precisely the responsibility for the moral position we take.
13 At  this  point  it  might  be  useful  to  connect  this  analysis  of  disagreement  to  Cavell’s
diagnosis  of  the  relationship  between  philosophy  and  skepticism.  In  Natural  and
Conventional, Cavell writes:
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In making the knowledge of others a metaphysical  difficulty,  philosophers deny
how real the practical difficulty is of coming to know another person, and how little
we can reveal of ourselves to another’s gaze, or bear of it. Doubtless such denials
are part of the motive which sustains metaphysical difficulties. (Cavell 1979: 90)
14 According  to  Cavell,  skepticism  about  other  minds  emerges  from  the  sense  of
separateness and limitation we may experience with respect to the knowledge of others.
The kind of response philosophy of mind has traditionally offered to this skepticism is
deflected  in  so  far  as  it  eludes  the  problem of  the  limitation  of  our  knowledge,  by
attempting to  show that  skeptical  experience is  empty.  This  is  reflected,  again,  in  a
conception of language and of the use of concepts as a set of fixed rules that we simply
apply, and beyond which there is nothing. That is to say that philosophy tries to face
skepticism  by  denying  the  very  possibility  of  experiencing  the  limitation  of  our
knowledge, by denying in that way what we may call the “truth of skepticism.” Similarly,
ethical theories, which see in the fact of disagreement the impossibility of a fully rational
moral thought, elude the difficulty of experiencing the limitation of morality. What is at
stake in moral discourse and in moral thought is the responsibility for the position we
take, and the possibility of calling into question such a position in a disagreement defines
the kind of rationality we have. The philosophical requirement of a moral rationality,
that  must  be  capable  of  settling  every  disagreement,  reflects  the  wish  to  avoid  a
responsibility we do not want. As Cavell puts it:
Morality must leave itself open to repudiation; it provides one possibility of settling
conflict, a way of encompassing conflict which allows the continuance of personal
relationship against the hard and apparently inevitable fact of misunderstanding,
mutually incompatible wishes, commitments, loyalties, interests and needs, a way
of mending relationships and maintaining the self in opposition to itself or others.
Other ways of settling or encompassing conflict are provided by politics, religion,
love and forgiveness, rebellion and withdrawal. (Cavell 1979: 269)
15 The possibility of seeing morality as limited is a crucial point for Cavell. Moral theories
express the desire of a final assessment of every action and conflict: they represent an
attempt to establish once and for all what we regard as right and important, and what is
not. In this way, it seems that every limitation or inapplicability of an ethical theory
means the failure of morality as a whole. But, according to Cavell, this is a moralization of
morality,  that  is,  the  tendency  to  understand  –  through  the  distinctions  and  the
intellectual instruments of moral theories – every situation and every human context,
taking for granted both that they belong to the domain of morality and a certain concept
of morality. A non-moralistic conception of morality must instead admit the possibility of
seeing it as limited, but also that its domain is not limitable in advance – that its domain
is not given – because there is no principle or rule that establishes what is important or of
value for us. This is the reason why Cavell affirms the possibility of:
a position whose excellence we cannot deny, taken by persons we are not willing or
able to dismiss, but which, morally, would have to be called wrong. And this has
provided a major theme of modern literature: the salvation of the self through the
repudiation of morality. (Cavell 1979: 269)
16 I  think in this  passage is  adumbrated the theme of  moral  perfectionism,  that  Cavell
developed in his works after The Claim of Reason. Indeed, it is only by acknowledging the
limitation of  morality  that  we can see the possibility  of  a  conflict  between our self-
conception and the requirements of morality.
17 In  pointing  to  an  apparent  irresolvable  conflict or  a  deep  tension  between  the
requirements of morality and the self-understanding that conditions them, the idea of
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“repudiation” might suggest a kind of skepticism concerning the reality of moral values
and the normativity of  moral  thought.  For if  morality were something that could be
repudiated when it conflicts with other, non-moral considerations or reasons, then one’s
assent to it would be just a matter of conventions and habits. This is the reason why
Raimond Gaita criticizes Cavell’s talking of “repudiation.” Gaita says:
Situations which might prompt someone to say that morality finds its limits are
various  and  they  do  not  instantiate  a  single  concept,  ‘the  limits  of  morality.’
Nothing, I think, that anyone might seriously mean by it need lead us, under pain of
superficiality or naivety, to acknowledge that there are things that human beings
do that are above or below the conceptual reach of a sober remorse. But is that not
to deny that morality must leave itself open to repudiation? (Gaita 1991: 240)
18 The answer to Gaita’s question depends on what we takes ‘morality’ to mean when we say
that it can be repudiated. I think that Gaita is right about Cavell’s lack of clarity on this
theme, but I also think that it is possible to understand Cavell’s talking of the ‘limits of
morality’ and to accommodate it to Gaita’s warning if we see it as a conflict within (what
Bernard Williams would call) ‘the ethical.’ What can be repudiated by a person “whose
excellence we cannot deny” is not the reality of values or the seriousness of remorse, but
the conventional  acceptance of  the standards imposed by a  culture.  Anyway,  for  my
purpose here it  is  not important to introduce the distinction between ‘morality’  and
‘ethics.’ What matters to me is to make clear that Cavell’s point is about the importance of
the relation between ethics and conceptions of the self, where a question about one’s
assent to the moral form of life is understood as a precondition for the development of a
non-conformist moral perspective. Once we have recognized this,  we can nonetheless
accept Gaita’s criticism that talking in general of the ‘limits of morality’ is not anything
clear, because “whether [one] can be rightly judged to be morally serious will depend on
the details of the example” (Gaita 1991: 242).
⁂
19 Following Cavell, I have characterized the meta-ethical analysis of disagreement in terms
of deflection. This notion is used to specify a precise philosophical strategy: it does not
mean  simply  to  misdescribe  a  reality.  It  means  to  turn  a  certain  kind  of  practical
difficulty,  which we want  to  elude,  into  an intellectual  difficulty.  Now,  which is  the
practical difficulty in question? What kind of difficulty may we encounter in our ordinary
moral  life,  which prompts us to intellectualize it? After all,  Cavell  claims that  moral
disagreement is a fact of our ordinary language, and that it does not compromise the
rationality of morality. But there is a difficulty internal to our moral life, which is part of
the  experience  we  have  of  certain  disagreements,  and  which  is  eclipsed  in  the  way
metathics has treated disagreement – that is, as a problem. To verify the plausibility of this
position it is necessary to specify the notion of ‘difficulty of reality,’ and to provide an
example of the kind of disagreement I have in mind.
20 In DRDP Diamond considers the “experience of the mind’s not being able to encompass
something  that  it  encounters.”  She  takes  her  examples  of  difficulty  of  reality  from
literature  and  poetry.  These  are  various  and  complex  examples,  which  refer  to
experiences of beauty and altruism, or of deep desperation and horror. I cannot dwell
upon the details of these examples, but they all concern circumstances in our life that we
are unable to describe, situations in which we experience a gulf between reality and our
capacity to understand it. Such a difficulty may turn on a difficulty of philosophy too,
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which could contribute in hiding that reality, bringing us to consider a problem which is
only similar to the one we were concerned with. Part of Diamond’s concern is to show
that the argumentative technique of analytic philosophy does not allow one to see that
kind of difficulty, and so it deflects from reality, transferring the problem to the secure
and controlled path of argumentation. Following one of Diamond’s examples, we can see
the deflection in the way Peter Singer turns Elizabeth Costello’s sense of horror for our
relationship with animals into a technical question about animal rights. The way in which
Singer understands the question eclipses the fact that Costello’s sense of horror arises
from her perception of  animals as lives of  bodies exposed to death.  By reducing the
corporeity of animals to a fact analyzable in terms of objective features, Singer hides
precisely Costello’s source of interest in animals.
21 Let  us  go  back  to  disagreement.  We  have  seen  that  according  to  Cavell  in  a  moral
conversation we express our overall  moral  vision,  for which we are responsible.  The
rationality of moral discourse lies in fact in the methods which lead us to a definition and
to a better knowledge of ourselves and of others. Now, in what sense is the problem of
knowledge of ourselves a difficulty which, in philosophy, we tend to deflect from? I want
to suggest  an  example  of  moral  conversation  quoting  a  dialogue  between  the  two
protagonists of Richard Yates’s Revolutionary Road.
⁂
22 Revolutionary Road is the story of April and Frank Wheeler, a young married couple living
in the residential neighborhood of Revolutionary Hill,  in Connecticut.  Frank is a young
office-worker for the Knox Company, April, an actress manquée, is a housewife and the
mother  of  two  children.  Although  they’re  perceived  by  their  neighbors  as  a  non
conformist couple, their life flows as a suburban middle-class cliché. But Frank and April
are dissatisfied with their condition, they recognize how oppressive and false their life is,
and try to find a way to imagine their future. April, in particular, feels the burden of the
“enormous, obscene delusion: the idea that people have to resign from real life and ‘settle
down’ when they have a family,” and so she thinks up a solution for her uneasiness and
that of Frank. She thinks they have to sell their house in Revolutionary Road and move to
Paris, where she would work as a secretary at NATO and where Frank, free from work,
would take his time to “find his way.” The project takes form, and they start putting up
the house for sale. But an unexpected pregnancy, together with Frank’s prospect of a job
promotion, make things more complicated. Frank, who has never really believed in the
project,  sees in the pregnancy (still  unwanted) the opportunity to keep his family in
Revolutionary Hill; April, on the contrary, is ready to have an abortion in order to chase
her new life. There begins a period of constant quarreling, creating a distance between
them that  cannot  be  closed.  Eventually  the  project  is  abandoned.  April’s  attempt  to
construe  an  authentic  life  begins  to  vanish  gradually,  then  rapidly,  violently,  and
tragically in the end. April dies, in her attempt to have the abortion.
23 In the following passage Frank and April are considering the possibility of having the
abortion:
“You really are a much more moral person than I am, Frank. I suppose that’s why I
admire you.” But she didn’t look or sound admiring.
He tried to dismiss it with a careful shrug as he took a seat across from her. “I don’t
know about that. I don’t see what any of this has to do with being ‘moral.’ I mean –
you know, not in any sense of conventional morality.”
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She seemed to think this over for a long time as she lay back allowing one knee to
sway from side to side, rocking it on the swivel of her ankle. Then: “Is there any
other kind?” she asked.  “Don’t  ‘moral’  and ‘conventional’  really mean the same
thing?”
He could have hit her in the face. Of all the insinuating, treacherous little – Christ!
And in any other month of his married life he would have been on his feet and
shouting: “Christ, when are you going to get over this damn Noël Coward, nineteen-
twenties way of denigrating every halfway decent human value with some cute,
brittle, snobbish little thing to say? Listen!” he would have raged at her. “Listen!
Maybe that’s the way your parents lived; maybe that’s the kind of chic, titillating
crap you were raised on, but it’s about time you figured out it doesn’t have a God
damned thing to do with the real world.” It was his knowledge of the calendar that
stopped his mouth. There were twelve days to go. He couldn’t afford to take any
chances now, and so instead of shouting those things he held his jaws shut and
stared at his glass, which he gripped until it nearly spilled with trembling. Without
even trying, he had given his most memorable facial performance to date. When
the spasm was over he said, very quietly:
“Baby, I know you’re tired. We shouldn’t be talking about it now. I know you know
better than that. Let’s skip it.”
“Skip what? You know I know better than what?”
“You know. This business about ‘moral’ and ‘conventional’.”
“But I don’t know the difference.” She had come earnestly forward on the sofa, had
drawn her sneakers back under it  and was leaning toward him with both tense
forearms on her knees. Her face was so innocently confused that he couldn’t look at
it. “Don’t you see, Frank? I really don’t know the difference. Other people seem to;
you do; I just don’t, that’s all, and I don’t think I ever really have.”
“Look,” he said. “First place, ‘moral’ was your word, not mine. I don’t think I’ve
ever held any brief for this thing on moral grounds, conventional or otherwise. I’ve
simply said that under these particular circumstances, it seems pretty obvious that
the only mature thing to do is go ahead and have the –”
“But there we are again,” she said. “You see? I don’t know what ‘mature’ means,
either, and you could talk all night and I still wouldn’t know. It’s all just words to
me, Frank. I watch you talking and I think: Isn’t that amazing? He really does think
that way; these words really do mean something to him. Sometimes it seems I’ve
been watching people talk and thinking that all my life” – her voice was becoming
unsteady – “and maybe it means there’s something awful the matter with me, but
it’s true. Oh no, stay there. Please don’t come and kiss me or anything, or we’ll just
end up in a big steaming heap and we won’t get anything settled. Please stay sitting
there, and let’s just sort of try to talk. Okay?” “Okay.” And he stayed sitting there.
But trying to talk was something else again;  all  they could do was look at each
other, heavy and weak and bright-eyed in the heat.
“All I know,” she said at last, “is what I feel, and I know what I feel I’ve got to do.”
(Yates 2000: 222-3)
24 I take April to be (unsuccessfully) trying to reach what Cavell calls “the salvation of the
self  through the repudiation of  morality.”  The idea that  morality  can be  repudiated
reflects a noncoercive conception of rationality that allows for the possibility of seeing
morality as limited, but it also imply that its limits cannot be traced in advance. As we
have seen, Cavell introduces that idea of repudiation in the context of a discussion of
moral disagreement in which he radically criticizes the non-cognitivist claim that the
persistence of disagreement in ethical disputes is a sign of the irrationality of morality. If
I understand Cavell’s point, to recognize the limits of morality means in this respect that
there are circumstances in which a rational resolution of moral disagreement is attained
by an agreement to disagree. That is to say that rational resolution is not always a matter
of bringing others around to one’s own moral convictions; it is sometimes a matter of
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agreeing to disagree. But pertaining to the sphere of first-person conflict, the idea of
repudiation suggests a further way of understanding the ‘limits of morality.’ It suggests
that an authentic assent to the moral form of life is never just a matter of sharing the
conventions and the practices we inherited through upbringing, but also depends on a
preliminary questioning and challenging those conventions and practices. The limits of
morality are in this sense not traceable in advance, that is, independently of personal
contribution and imaginative effort. But as the example above shows, questioning our
assent to morality may lead to a non-ordinary experience of conceptual inadequacy, or
inexpressibility. April is in fact trying to break the conventions of her moral community,
because she feels that she cannot be herself (or become the person she wants to be) and
carry on favoring the standards imposed on her by that community. Yates is effective in
describing the difficulty of assuming the responsibility for the moral position we take. In
trying  to  do  so,  April  exposes  herself  to  the  risk  of  losing  reality  as  graspable:  her
personal transformation puts her in the condition of not recognizing anymore reality as
her reality. Her experience can be understood as a difficulty of reality in Diamond’s sense
because she feels that she can no longer speak within the ordinary language games of her
community.  Indeed,  in  losing  the  capacity  to  distinguish  between  “moral”  and
“conventional,” April encounters a particular difficulty with words that discloses reality
as  essentially  resistant  to  her  ways  of  thinking  and  talking  about  it,  as  at  once
inexplicable and isolating.
25 Now I want to focus on the disagreement between April and Frank. In the quoted dialogue
the disagreement marks the beginning of a tragedy: the distance between Frank and April
is not simply a question about the legitimacy of abortion as a practical solution in view of
moving to Paris, but it has to do with a radical difference of vision, which exposes April to
an experience of separateness and isolation that becomes critical as the story unfolds.
Frank thinks that the “the only mature thing to do” is to have the baby and give up the
idea of leaving: his feigned resoluteness is due to opportunism and hypocrisy (he has
already  accepted  the  new  job),  but  his  opposition  to  abortion  is  the  outcome  of  a
conception of values as fixed principles that determine in advance the possibilities for
personal articulation and imaginative understanding of the moral life. We can see how
Frank uses the question of abortion to deflect from the real problem that distances him
from his wife: a very different conception of life. What is for him a space of determined
possibilities, is for April an adventure, in which the possibilities are still in a large part to
be  determined.  April  and  Frank  disagree  in  the  way  they  perceive  the  relevance  of
abortion:  whereas  for  Frank there’s  a  principle  one needs  to  conform to  (having an
abortion is against nature), April lives the tragedy of feeling the option of having the
abortion as a natural necessity, that is, as a necessity of her nature. Since deciding to
move to Paris, April engaged in a path of knowledge which will lead her to isolation from
her moral community: this sense of separateness is reflected in the fact that the concepts
which defined that community (family, abortion, job, maturity, etc.) have for her no sense
anymore, nor do they grasp reality.
26 In  Diamond’s  terminology,  we  encounter  a  difficulty  of  reality  when  we  live  an
experience  that  puts  into  question  our  ordinary  way  of  speaking.  In  the  kind  of
disagreement  which  divides  the  Wheelers  we  can  see  the  difficulty  internal  to  the
problem of the knowledge of ourselves: April experiences the radical impoverishment of
her conceptual horizon, the inability to express her own vision and to grasp the world
with her own voice. Frank’s response to such an extreme loss is precisely a denial of
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April’s experience: in deflecting towards the question of abortion and in centering only
on that problem, he treats April’s tragedy as a childish whim, or worse, he sees in it the
symptom of a disease of personality. The dialogue quoted goes on with Frank inviting
April to “rationalize” her position:
“Look,” he was saying, “this may sound as if I think there is something ‘awful’ the
matter with you; the fact is  I  don’t.  I  do think, though, that there’s one or two
aspects to this thing we haven’t really touched on yet, and I think we ought to. For
instance, I wonder if your real motives here are quite as simple as you think. I mean
isn’t it possible there are forces at work here that you’re not entirely aware of?
That you’re not recognizing?”
She didn’t answer, and in the darkness he could only guess at whether she was
listening or not. He took a deep breath. “I mean things that have nothing to do with
Europe,” he said, “or with me. I mean things within yourself, things that have their
origin in your own childhood – your own upbringing and so on. Emotional things.”
There was a long silence before she said, in a pointedly neutral tone: “You mean I’m
emotionally disturbed.”
“I didn’t say that!” But in the next hour, as his voice went on and on, he managed to
say it several times in several different ways. Wasn’t it likely, after all, that a girl
who’d  known  nothing  but  parental  rejection  from the  time  of  her  birth  might
develop an abiding reluctance to bear children?
“I mean it’s always been a wonder to me that you could survive a childhood like
that,” he said at one point, “let alone come out of it without any damage to your –
you know, your ego and everything.” She herself, he reminded her, had suggested
the presence of something “neurotic” in her wish to abort the first pregnancy, on
Bethune Street – and all right, all right, of course the circumstances were different
this time. But wasn’t it just possible that something of the same confusion might
still exist in her attitude? Oh, he wasn’t saying this was the whole story – “I’m not
qualified to say that” – but he did feel it was a line of reasoning that ought to be very
carefully explored.
“But I’ve had two children,” she said. “Doesn’t that count in my favor?”
He let these words reverberate in the darkness for a while. “The very fact that you
put it that way is kind of significant,” he said quietly, “don’t you think? As if having
children were a kind of punishment? As if having two of them could ‘count in your
favor’ as a credit against any obligation to have another? And the way you said it,
too – all defensive, all ready to fight. Jesus, April, if you want to talk that way I can
come right back at you with another statistic: you’ve had three pregnancies and
you’ve wanted to abort two of them. What kind of a record is that? Oh, look.” He
made his voice very gentle, as if he were talking to Jennifer.
“Look, baby. All I’m trying to suggest is that you don’t seem to be entirely rational
about this thing. I just wish you’d think about it a little, that’s all.”
“All right,” her voice said bleakly. “All right, suppose all this is true. Suppose I’m
acting out a compulsive behavior pattern, or whatever they call it. So what? I still
can’t help what I feel, can I? I mean what’re we supposed to do about it? How am I
supposed to get over it? Am I just supposed to Face Up to my Problems and start
being a different person tomorrow morning, or what?”
“Oh,  baby,”  he  said.  “It’s  so  simple.  I  mean  assuming  you  are  in  some  kind  of
emotional difficulty, assuming there is a problem of this sort, don’t you see there is 
something we can do about it? Something very logical and sensible that we ought to
do about it?” He was weary of the sound of his own voice;  he felt  he had been
talking for years. He licked his lips, which tasted as foreign as the flesh of a dentist’s
finger in his mouth (“Open wide, now!”), and then he said it. “We ought to have you
see a psychoanalyst.” (Yates: 2000: 224)
27 I think Frank’s response is a kind of deflection aiming at denying the radical experience
of  isolation  that  characterizes  April’s  relationship  with  the  world.  He  turns  April’s
practical difficulty into an intellectual dispute about the legitimacy of abortion. In fact he
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invites April to hesitate, he asks her to think about “the real motives” which make her
desire the abortion,  and puts forward a psychological  explanation of the problem, in
order to convince April to talk with an analyst. And it is this hesitation, the instilled
suspicion of a neurosis as an explanation for her condition, that will make the hope of a
change  definitively  collapse.  (I  find  it  noteworthy  that  Yates  represents  Frank  as
experiencing his own words “as foreign as the flesh of a dentist’s finger in his mouth”: by
endorsing the values of the community in an uncritical way, he becomes alienated to
himself, and the very sound of his voice becomes strange to him, but that strangeness is
not experienced by him as a difficulty in Diamond’s sense, and rather it shows an ‘absence
of morality’).
28 But what would it mean to understand April’s position in a non-deflected way? At the end
of DRDP Diamond asks in a similar vein: “Can there be such a thing as philosophy that is
not deflected from such realities?,” that is, a philosophy capable of staying at the level of
the difficulties of reality? And which is the level of the difficulties of reality? Is that
something we can understand as a determinate point of view on the world, a perspective
that can be occupied by a person finding herself in particular conditions? Or is it rather
an  apparent  position  from which  no  intelligible  representation  of  the  world  can  be
satisfying?  According  to  Diamond,  the  answer  to  such  questions  is  related  to
Wittgenstein’s aim of bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.
In the second section of this paper I discussed Cavell’s idea that disagreement is a fact of
our ordinary language, that this fact is part of our natural modes of responsiveness; so
now, following Diamond and Cavell, the question might be put this way:
What can the difficulty be, then, of bringing or leading words back? What is the
everyday, if it is so hard to achieve? It is within the everyday that there lie the
forms and varieties of repudiation of our language-games and distance from them,
the  possibility  of  being  tormented  by  the  hiddenness,  the  separateness,  the
otherness of others. (Cavell, Declining Decline, quoted in DRDP: 113)
29 We  have  seen  that  April’s  encounter  with  a  difficulty  of  reality  has  the  form  of  a
dissatisfaction with the ordinary language-games that articulate the moral life of her
community. In finding the ‘limits of morality’, she cannot reach a meaningful description
that could accommodate her attitude towards the world.  From this point of  view,  to
acknowledge her position without deflecting means to follow her in the impossibility to
give a determinate sense to words such as ‘moral’ and ‘conventional.’ Indeed, as we have
seen in Frank’s response, to try to make sense of April’s position by treating it as an
ordinary  matter  (by,  for  example,  offering  a  psychological  explanation  of  “the  real
motives” of her behavior, or talking about the problem of abortion) means precisely to
deny those qualities of her experience that make it difficult in the relevant way. The only
way to acknowledge the difficulty of reality here is to imaginatively participate in the
‘sideways-on’ perspective from which April looks at the world, in the very same way in
which, according to Diamond, the reader of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is required to enter
imaginatively into the nonsensical  sentences that  make up the book.2 If  this  is  true,
Diamond’s commitment to what she calls “the realistic spirit” in philosophy requires, at
least when confronting with a difficulty of reality, an understanding of “the ordinary” as
the locus in which our life with words may become problematic and strange, not the
quietistic achievement of a condition in which our problems disappear.
⁂
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30 I picked up the example of April and Frank Wheeler because it shows us a kind of distance
between human beings in which what is at stake is not a judgment about the rightness of
an action, or the legitimacy of a choice. Meta-ethical analyses, because of their comparing
moral judgments with factual or scientific ones, tend to conceive moral disagreements
only as disagreements about how things are in the world. But April and Frank Wheeler do
not disagree about particular judgments, they are divided in the way they respond to life,
in the way they use their concepts to structure their life and understand others. What
divides them has not the aspect of a factual disagreement. In the example the situation is
complicated by the fact that April experiences a sense of separateness that flings her
away from her own mode of thinking and talking, and this represents a kind of difficulty
that philosophy should be able to account for without deflecting.
31 I want to conclude with some brief remarks about the consequences of the conception of
moral discourse and thought favored here for the problem of objectivity in ethics. Both
Diamond and Cavell have drawn from Wittgenstein a conception of rationality and of
language as a range of possibilities in which the application of concepts is not fixed by
external rules and independently from personal contribution. One of the possibilities we
have is that of calling into question our conceptual horizon, that is the possibility of
feeling that our words have lost their grasp on the world, and this define the kind of
difficulty I have been concerned with.
32 It  may seem,  though,  that  if  we follow Cavell  and Diamond in thinking that  a  non-
moralistic conception of morality should allow for the possibility of seeing morality as
limited, then we must recognize that ethics is just a matter of subjective articulation. But
this conclusion seems inevitable only on the ground of a widespread assumption about
the concept of objectivity that excludes the subjective (that is perceptual and affective)
endowments we draw on in thinking about the world because they tend to distort our
view of reality. Alice Crary calls this conception the “narrow conception of objectivity”
(Crary 2007: 18-29), which is the result of a philosophical requirement that any inquiry
aiming  at  calling  itself  objective  must  establish  that  there  is  a  reliable  connection
between its conceptual space and some realm independent of it. In this paper I tried to
show that the idea of the ‘limits of morality’  “does not instantiate a single concept,”
where this means that persons find different ways of articulating their moral views that
cannot be determined a priori. We just do not know what people will find important and
worthy of value, and so we should resist the deflecting effort to construct a theory of
moral disagreement or objectivity.
33 In the light of Diamond’s conception I have sketched above, that morality be objective can
plausibly mean that the aspirations to deepen our moral views and resolving our conflicts
are  rational.  But  as  Cavell  urges,  the  rationality  of  morality  does  not  relieve  us  of
responsibility for the position we take. A realistic philosophical task would be then that of
looking at the various ways in which people articulate their moral experience, even when
they generate idiosyncratic visions as in the example of April Wheeler. It would make
headway in understanding morality as an intensely human affair.
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NOTES
1. In Part Three of The Claim of Reason Cavell is primarily concerned with criticizing Stevenson’s
emotivism. Although Stevenson seems hopelessly crude to contemporary and more sophisticated
versions  of  non-cognitivism  (e.  g.  error-theories,  expressivism,  prescriptivism  and  quasi-
realism), I think that what renders Cavell's point on the limitations of non-cognitivist theories
still timely is his understanding of the discontinuity between ethics and science in a way that
does not depend on a metaphysical  distinction between facts  and values.  Another important
difference is that Cavell does not conceive ethical meaning as a feature (neither a logical one, like
in Hare’s prescriptivism, nor a psychological one, like in various forms of expressivism) of ethical
sentences.  Cavell  (like  Diamond)  inherited  from  Wittgenstein  the  idea  that  a  sentence  is
meaningless not because it does not show some logical feature or syntactical form, but because
we failed to give meaning to one or more of its components. Contemporary non-cognitivism has
been criticized in a way that can accommodate Cavell’s point also by John McDowell and Hilary
Putnam. For a radical criticism of the distinction between facts and values see Putnam 2002; for a
criticism of the “disentangling manoeuvre” in accounting for the meaning of ethical concepts,
see McDowell 1998.
2. On this point see Diamond 1991.
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ABSTRACTS
In  this  paper I  want  to  consider  a  kind of  inexpressiveness  that  can characterize  our moral
experience. The acknowledgement of the possibility of failure in trying to word the world – to
find  adequate  means  of  expression  for  our  condition  –  deeply  informs  Cora  Diamond’s
conception of language and moral thought as well as her philosophical method. In particular, in
her paper The Difficulty  of  Reality  and the  Difficulty  of  Philosophy Diamond is  concerned with a
resistance by reality to one’s ordinary modes of thinking and talking, the feeling of a mismatch
between concepts and experience in which it is the nature of experience itself that deprives one
of the words suitable to contain it.
In  this  paper  I  want  to  show  how  a  particular  kind  of  moral  conflict  can  be  perspicuously
described as a difficulty of reality. This conflict occurs when we lose the ability to conceive the
moral world we inhabit as ours, when, that is, our self-conceptions clash with the requirements
of morality and we find ourselves in the position of not being able to say what “morality” means
for us anymore.
Stanley Cavell speaks in this vicinity of the possibility of repudiating morality when it threatens
our integrity. This distance between the subject and the world, the self and morality, which, in
Cavell’s account of perfectionism, is a precondition for the development of an authentic moral
perspective, is nonetheless neglected by metathical analyses in which the prominent occurrences
of ethical disagreements pertain principally to the correct application of evaluative terms.
I sketch Cavell’s analysis of disagreement in the light of his discussion of moral rationality. Then
I  connect  the  topic  with  Diamond’s  notion of  the  “difficulty  of  reality,”  developing  the  link
between Diamonds and Cavell’s thought by using an example taken from Richard Yates’s novel
Revolutionary Road.
My aim will be twofold: the focus on Cavell’s conception of moral rationality, on the one hand, is
intended to show how the traditional meta-ethical debate about disagreement is deflected in that
it cannot acknowledge this kind of conflict; on the other hand, to speak of a difficulty of reality in
the context of a perfectionist account of moral life is a way to give content to the idea of morality
as “limited,” a way of understanding morality as of human origin.
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